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Un fabricante espera que su producto tenga un contenido medio de grs. Se desea una alta confiabilidad. Un nuevo equipo produce los mismos enlatados a un costo medio de B. En algunas ocasiones conviene tomar las observaciones por pares xi1 , xi2 , de tal forma que los dos miembros de cada par sea parecidos en todos los aspectos, excepto en el que tratamos de medir.

El Departamento de Ventas quiere comparar los resultados obtenidos por dos de sus vendedores. Cada uno de ellos tiene una zona de ventas; de cada zona se toma una muestra al azar de 4 y 6 sub-zonas respectivamente. Mediante dos procesos se manufactura cable de alambre. Se desea determinar si los procesos tienen diferentes efectos en la resistencia media de ruptura del cable. Diferencia de dos proporciones. Tablas de contingencia. Test para la bondad de un ajuste.

Determine el intervalo de confianza. Ejemplo: 1. Pi luego: color azul O1j O2j O3j O4j O5j Orj Oij Er3 j E1j E2j E3j Eij Erj c E1c E2c E3c Eic Un organismo debe elegir entre planes de seguro. Observada 3 6 10 4 4 27 Eij : f. Ejemplo: Al fabricar un producto, el llenado de los envases se realiza con un promedio de 14 grs. En algunos casos es importante analizar el comportamiento de la variabilidad de un suceso.

Estos deben ser calculados para cada muestra. Ejemplo: En un estudio a base de muestras, las variables se clasificaron en cuatro grupos. Por ejemplo, las ventas de una empresa y los cobros correspondientes. Errores de muestreo. Intervalos de confianza.

En efecto, xi es la variable objeto del estudio utilizado para estimar la media poblacional X. En efecto, se tiene que son 50 con un saldo total de Bs. Hacer una muestra sobre las restantes que tienen un saldo inferior o igual a Bs.

Finally, if the innovation gains did not offset the cost of compliance, or were not perceived by companies to do so, environmental regulation could be used to enforce measures to improve environmental quality. Porter and van der Linde argue that firms innovate in response to environmental regulation in two broad forms.

First, companies could simply get smarter about how to deal with pollution once it occurs or how to reduce the amount of toxic or harmful material generated. This sort of innovation would merely reduce the cost of compliance with pollution control. The second form of innovation would address environmental impacts while simultaneously improving the affected product or the related processes. The benefits of the resulting innovation offsets could exceed the cost of compliance, and thus increase industrial competitiveness.

Porter and van der Linde divide the potential innovation offsets into product offsets and process offsets. Inversely, product offsets could also decrease production or product disposal costs.

Production offsets would occur through higher resource productivity such as higher process yields, reduced downtime, materials savings, an improved utilisation of by-products, lower energy consumption, lower handling costs, and the like. Many economists met the notion that environmental regulations may benefit firms, over and above improvements in environmental quality, with considerable scepticism.

Portney, and other economists like Palmer et al. The empirical evidence on the validity of the Porter hypothesis is mixed. Using a process analysis framework to consistently account for non-separabilities in pollution and pollution abatement practices, Smith and Walsh conclude that apparent productivity gains could appear to be greater with environmental regulation than without, even when they are not. Their finding appears to cast doubt on earlier studies that found supporting evidence for the Porter hypothesis, since they may be the result of inadequacies in the methods used to decompose the influences of productivity change.

Based on the notion that managers can be myopic, that is, that they can take wrong investment decisions, Schmutzler analyses the circumstances under which environmental regulation might raise the expected profits of firms.

He identified several factors pertaining to the likelihood of innovation offsets. First, the type of regulation is important. The more flexible regulations are, the more scope they leave for innovation. Second, technological factors are important, as benefits from innovations arise mainly in the long-run. Third, the market environment needs to be conductive to innovation. In other words, there needs to be some market pressure for innovation to overcome organisational inefficiencies of the firm.

And finally, the firm structure appears most important, as innovation in a firm occurs when there is communication and mutual learning between different departments and the management. Once their model took account for other factors that might influence environmental performance, Dasgupta et al. Instead, they highlight the importance of introducing environmental management systems, such as ISO , regulatory enforcement, duties to inform the public about environmental performance, employee education, and plant size.

Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw tested the standard criticism that economists have about the Porter hypothesis, which is the idea that if opportunities existed to improve the competitive position through innovation, firms would not have to be triggered by an extra cost to take them. Their model confirms this criticism, but also shows that downsizing and modernisation of firms subject to environmental regulation increases the average productivity. Another positive effect of downsizing and modernisation is the marginal decrease of profits and environmental damage.

Rege introduces a slightly different rationale why environmental regulation may improve the competitiveness of domestic industries. She departs from the notion that regulators require domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce, or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating.

This would improve competitiveness because firms are forced to provide credible information about the environmental qualities of their products. Because such credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market and consumers could be more willing to buy them.

Based on their empirical analysis on 53 large Spanish companies, Garces and Galve report that command-and-control regulation often binds companies to make environmental investments that are not productive in the conventional economic sense.

They note, however, that their findings do not necessarily disagree with the Porter hypothesis, as their investigation considered only the effect of command-and-control regulation in the short term. His model shows that endogenous technical change makes the Porter hypothesis feasible. Finally, based on their study on the productivity growth patterns of chemical industries at U.

In that respect, their findings were inconsistent with the Porter hypothesis. However, they also point out that the lack of a significant negative relationship suggests that environmental protection measures do not appear to reduce productivity growth either. In conclusion, the academic discussion on the validity and implications of the Porter hypothesis has sparked a lively interdisciplinary exchange of opinions. While many economists dismiss the idea on the grounds of theoretical considerations, some empirical contributions have produced supporting evidence.

The timing o f induced technological change Based on the basic notion of the Porter Hypothesis, which states that environmental regulation may induce technological change, one strand of economic literature investigates the issue of how to achieve optimal timing with regard to induced change. Apparently on the grounds of data availability, many contributions in this research arena concentrate on CO2 emissions as example. Nordhaus ; b was the first to obtain analytical expressions for the optimal pollution tax trajectory.

Further contributions include, among others, Ulph and Ulph ; , Sinclair , Farzin and Tahovonnen , Farzin , Peck and Wan , as well as Goulder and Mathai For instance, Wigley et al. For this reason, legislators could wait until scientific advances made such abatement less costly. By contrast, Ha-Doung et al. The idea behind this is that nations that benefit the most from adopting a new technology are typically those nations that currently use the worst technologies.

On the firm level, Colby et al. They argued that the right timing in responding to environmental regulation is critical to the success of enterprises, as firms have to decide which strategy they want to pursue. On the one hand, being the first out of the blocks with a new process, product, or technology may confer an advantage in the form of favourable customer perception or the chance to shape regulation.

On the other hand, being first could also be expensive, with competitors quickly following along the learning curve. There was also the risk of governments failing to reward successful innovators, or even putting them at a disadvantage. For this reason, Colby et al. According to the findings of Maglia and Sassoon , strictly economic factors such as productivity and the cost of labour, go a long way to explaining the lack of competitiveness of chemical industries.

They also assert that lagging chemical industries cannot afford additional burdens in terms of industry regulation. Hence, they seem to dismiss the notion of leapfrogging.

However, Stigler was one of the first to argue that regulation could be sought by industry because it constituted a barrier to entry. The implication of this hypothesis is that compliance costs should in some way increase economic rents. The evidence from these contributions, which were typically event studies of a single regulation or a subset of regulations, appears inconclusive.

Some studies have concluded that compliance costs resulting from technology regulation could create barriers to entry and scarcity rents, others have reached the opposite conclusion. In the case of environmental regulation, Helland and Matsuno note that even authors examining the same regulatory event have reached opposite conclusions. For instance, this was the case with regard to the contributions of Pashigian ; versus Evans , as well as to the studies of Maloney and McCormick versus Hughes et al.

Dean et al. Their results suggest that a greater intensity of environmental regulation is associated with fewer small business formations. Since there are no apparent effects on the formation of large establishments, Dean et al. Helland and Matsuno examine the impact of compliance costs of economic profits, using data of the U.

Environmental Protection Agency on environmental compliance costs at industry level. Their results indicate that compliance expenditures create or increase rents for larger firms in an industry by increasing the barriers to entry.

Helland and Matsuno note that these results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that economic profits are created when economies of scale in pollution abatement are coupled with restrictions on output due to environmental standards. Before the background of lax environmental regulation in India, Pradhan and Barik observe that the Indian pulp and paper industry shows signs of weakening competing capacity, as it is characterised by a declining technical change and diseconomies of scale.

This tendency gives an upper hand to rivals in the international market. Pradhan and Barik argue that, for these reasons, the industry is facing profitability constraints, which prevent it from switching to cleaner technologies. Overall, this study appears to show that the lack of appropriate environmental regulation may lower the barriers to market entry, and that this was taken advantage of by the international competitors of the Indian pulp and paper industry.

Dooley and Fryxell as well as Hitchens contribute another view to the notion that larger firms could be more capable of complying with higher environmental standards than their competitors. Based on an empirical study about the diversification of U.

This could lead to the conclusion that not only the size of firms plays a role in determining their capacity to reduce pollution, but also their strategic focus. It should be noted that a very similar case of establishing entry barriers could also be made at macroeconomic level. Modelling the linkages between trade and environmental policies, Copeland states that countries, which import pollution intensive goods, may have an incentive to try to link trade agreements with environmental agreements.

On the other hand, countries that export pollution-intensive goods have an incentive to prevent just that - by trying to obtain binding commitments to free trade prior to negotiations over global pollution. In conclusion, both theoretical as well as empirical literature seems to point out the importance of environmental regulation in the creation of market barriers.

Most contributions note that established and larger enterprises would gain from environmental regulation vis-a-vis their smaller competitors or newcomers on the market. Surveys on this strand of literature were carried out, among others, by Goulder , Oates , Bovenberg and Goulder , as well as Parry and Oates The theoretical basis of environmental taxation was laid by Arthur Cecil Pigou , who introduced the notion of corrective taxes.

The Pigouvian theory of taxation, which emerges in a discussion on spillover effects that impose costs on non-transacting parties, stipulates that appropriately designed taxes could limit polluting behaviour while minimizing social costs.

However, Pigou later stated that, although corrective taxes seemed good in theory, they would not work in practice. He argued that environmental taxes were not likely to be set according to their environmental logic, but rather for other reasons Pigou ; Ciocirlan and Yandle develop this notion further and show, based on a political economy model using OECD data, that policymakers do not commonly set taxes with a specific concern for the environment but that their primary focus is to generate revenue.

The latter effect could seem plausible if revenues from environment-related taxes were used to reduce the rates of pre-existing taxes that distort labour and capital markets Parry and Bento ; Bye Besides the obvious benefit this strategy could bring to labour market, there are some additional benefits from environmental taxes that are, in some studies, overlooked.

For example, Eskeland b mentions the benefit of environmental protection to industrial producers, such as less polluted water sources for brewers, or less congested roads for trucks. Not surprisingly, policy makers have been quick in picking-up the notion of a double dividend, as it appears to solve a number of hot political issues, like unemployment, competitiveness and taxation, at the same time for example, European Commission ; There are a number of studies that have investigated the conditions under which the double dividend hypothesis could hold.

They depart from the notion that the hypothesis, in its pure form, ignores an important source of interaction between environmental taxes and the pre-existing taxes. Since environmental taxes cause the costs and prices of products to rise, they tend to discourage labour supply and investment. By doing so, environmental taxes exacerbate the efficiency cost associated with tax distortions in labour and capital markets.

Only if the distortions in the pre-existing tax system are high, the introduction of environmental taxes can be a leverage to improve welfare even without considering the improvement in environmental quality Felder and Schleininger He notes that this finding was in line with most existing literature, but disagrees with the common explanations for this lack of measurable economic consequences.

Typically, contributions put this down to the fact that 1 measures of environmental stringency were poorly quantified, 2 compliance costs were modest, 3 variance in compliance costs among jurisdictions was small, and 4 cross-section data were insufficient to explore the consequences of increasingly stringent standards.

Levinson refutes some of these explanations and argues that the most compelling explanation left appeared to be that pollution-intensive industries are also those that are the least geographically footloose. In this case, environmental authorities would find themselves in the favourable position of being able to tax the most pollution-intensive industries at the highest rates without worrying about capital or labour flight to competing jurisdictions Levinson Therefore, aside from this case, the cost from this so-called tax interaction or tax shifting effect might dominate any efficiency benefits from recycling environmental tax revenues in other tax reductions.

In consequence, an environmental tax reform might typically increase rather than decrease the efficiency costs of pre-existing tax distortions. Other contributions that found theoretical or empirical evidence to limit the applicability of double dividend hypothesis, include Bovenberg and de Mooij , Kennedy and Laplante ; , Bovenberg , de Mooij and Bovenberg , Ligthart and van der Ploeg , and Eskeland a.

Goodstein questions the existence of a tax interaction effect altogether. Moreover, Goodstein points out that the entire double dividend debate has so far been held within a relatively small circle of environmental economists, arguing that their finding are largely uncontested due to a lack of critical mass in the research arena. In their model, a tax on capital is used to raise revenue to finance public goods and as a distortion factor. The nature of the tax competition in their model is a capital relocation externality; in other words, capital is assumed to move to untaxed regions.

Based on the model, Oates and Schwab predict too few public goods and too low a level of environmental quality relative to the firstbest optimum. Using industry-level data regarding four heavily polluting industries, Morgenstem et al.

They concluded that their data did not support the notion of a jobs-versus-the-environment trade-off. Parry et al. Modelling welfare gains from innovation under a variety of scenarios, Parry et al. Only when innovation was assumed to reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly, and when the initially optimal abatement level was fairly modest, welfare gains from innovation resulted to be greater than from optimal pollution control.

There also seems to be some theoretical basis for the existence of a double dividend. Empirical studies on those issues have not produced a coherent picture on the validity of both theories.

A first group of contributions in this field establish the theoretical foundation of this relationship. For example, Ayres and Kneese show that pollution is inherent to the production and the consumption of an economy. Their study points at a trade-off between production and consumption on the one hand, and pollution on the other hand. Elaborating on this basic link, a number of studies assessed its implications. If higher production levels implied increased pollution, environmental regulation that succeeds to improve the pollution performance of countries should be expected to affect production values negatively.

The issue has gained considerable prominence, since the expected negative impact of pollution reduction goals laid down in the Kyoto Protocol was one reason for the U. Isolating that effect, literature on technological change seems to show that the cost of pollution abatement could be quite significant. A later study by Khanna estimated considerably higher GDP losses in the region of approximately 6 percent in average. Krause et al. As a result of this, the cost estimates that those studies had produced were far too pessimistic.

To reason their point, Krause et al. The analysis of Krause et al. In conclusion, economic theory puts forward the notion of a positive link between production and pollution levels. The basic notion appears to be widely accepted in the literature. However, some contributions argue that while the implied trade-off between production and pollution performance may be right, calculations on the potential economic loss due to pollution reduction may fall short of covering all economic implications.

One of the main branches of economics that have dealt with environmental considerations was the trade arena. Because disputes about the linkages between trade and the environment have intensified over the last decades, the relationship between environmental standards and trade has become an issue at the forefront of policy debate. One example of this were the profound differences among the participants of the World Trade Organization Meeting in Seattle in over the issue whether trade agreements should be linked to international environmental standard regimes.

The dispute could not be resolved, and could be considered one of the reasons that led to the failure of the meeting Wilson et al.

The altered model reveals that if environmental costs are not reflected in the domestic production of commodities in the trading countries, it will increase the production of goods, which would normally be imported, and decrease the production of exports. In other words, by not reflecting environmental costs one would distort the market and thus impede trade. Theories of international trade that build on the Ricardian model cfi, Blanchard ; Jayadevappa and Chhatre use natural resources or climate as potential determinants of labour productivity.

Such models understand productivity as a function of production factors. One fundamental concept of environmental economics is the notion of an environmental externality. An externality exists whenever the welfare of some agent depends not only on his or her activities but also on activities under the control of some other agent for which he is not monetarily compensated Tietenberg The concept applies to many environment-related issues. For example, some agents such as polluting industries use environmental resources, which in turn may have impact on the welfare of others.

General equilibrium analysis Studies which use the general equilibrium framework to investigate the determination of output take a look at the equilibrium of all three markets, i. From their perspective, one important question regarding pollution control measures is whether the reduction in potential output induced by them is symmetrical between trading sectors or not.

In effect, the terms of trade remain the same while the price of goods increases Jayadevappa and Chhatre Capital intensive trade sectors should be expected to suffer from expensive environmental control measures more than labour intensive trade sectors. The models predict that the volume and gains of trade decline more in the capital intensive sectors than in labour intensive branches. Therefore, resource diversions into environmental control activities may lead to reduced output and consumption of tradable goods.

Besides an overall reduction in trade, this development would imply a real cost of environmental control to society. Walter b shows through a general equilibrium model that environmental costs could be increased by demand for environmental quality, and that they would draw resources away from exports and imports.

As a result, trade declines while the production and consumption of environmentally friendlier goods would increase. As a result, this demand would trigger a flow of environment-related services. The demand may vary across nations, since the EAC, the natural endowment of countries, and the value accorded to the environment might differ between them Siebert Therefore, environmental policy of one country could affect the environmental quality in another country through specialisation and trade.

It should be noted, however, that some studies on the impact of EAC on the pattern of trade could not confirm this line of argument Pething The impact o f increased trade on the environment The existing literature provides no conclusive picture regarding the impact of trade on the environment Bhagwati ; Daly ; French ; Jayadevappa and Chhatre Other scholars contend that trade could also have positive effect on the environment.

Applying this notion to the environment, one may argue that through trade-derived income, environmental technologies and management systems could be disseminated. Furthermore, trade could provide incentives for more stringent environmental standards, and may have the potential to enhance environmental harmonisation among countries.

For example, using a three dimensional trade model to analyse the effects of pollution reduction, Koo concludes that trade would increase real income, and that some of these gains may be in the form of cleaner environment. Copeland and Taylor look at the linkage between national income, pollution and trade. They show that income gains from trade do affect pollution levels. Free trade, they argued, raised real income, but also changed the composition of national output and therefore alters the incidence and level of pollution.

If the pattern of trade-induced specialisation was driven only by differences in pollution policy, then aggregate world pollution might rise with trade. If income levels differed between countries, free trade would increase world pollution Copeland and Taylor In a later study, Copeland and Taylor contend that under certain circumstances, free trade would increase pollution while reducing real income. Such an observation, they argued, would prove their trade-induced environmental degradation hypothesis.

Free trade and the environment As Jayadevappa and Chhatre point out, a number of arguments in the literature have the potential to weaken the argument for free trade, as they appear to show that suitable tariffs might improve world resource allocation.

This notion is of course a source of controversy. Some contributions, like the study of d'Arge and Kneese , contend that measures to control trade in order to protect the environment did not have significant effects on the long-term comparative advantage or efficiency of trading partners nor on the balance of payments or domestic incomes in the short term.

If both the production as well as the consumption of a good causes pollution, appropriate environmental policies could improve welfare and environmental quality when the small country opens for trade. On the other hand, Anderson and Blackhurst also argue that in such a situation any trade intervention to abate pollution would reduce welfare. However, if industrial countries produce pollution intensive goods for which there are competing imported goods, unilaterally introduced environmental standards would improve the terms of trade for poorer countries.

As a result, the production of pollution intensive goods would be moved from richer to poorer economies, provided that capital is internationally mobile. Conventional trade models suggest that unilateral environmental regulation, or harmonisation of environmental regulation, may be damaging to trade performance Ulph ; Ulph notes that, in a textbook trade model of a small open economy with a welfare maximising government and no other distortions, national governments would wish to pursue free trade and full internalisation of externalities, such as environmental damages.

If countries were different in terms of endowments of natural resources or in terms of their preferences regarding environmental quality, harmonisation of environmental policies would be undesirable because it would prevent the operation of environmental comparative advantages.

If markets are imperfectly competitive, and governments cannot use trade instruments, then they will have incentives to alter their environmental policies to gain a strategic trade advantage. This practice could, but does not necessarily need to, result in environmental dumping. The second reason is in line with concepts of political economy, which are based on the notion that governments might not seek to maximise welfare but rather maximise a utility function which may include social welfare but also reflect the influence of special interest groups.

In the context of the European Union and based on an endogenous-policy model, Bommer argues that European integration and policy harmonisation make downward competition of national environmental standards unlikely. Based on a model with international capital mobility and local pollution, they argue that in some cases local welfare maximising governments may have an incentive to discriminate against polluting industries.

This assertion holds when the implicit factor reward on pollution, which is the monetary gain from exploiting the competitive advantage due to ecological dumping, leaves the country because it accrues to foreign owners of mobile capital.

Harris et al. In consequence, they argue that environmental policies have hardly any effect on comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. Their study shows that the demand for energy and transport are generally inelastic. The price elasticity was found to be significantly different from zero but smaller than 1.

That means that a 1 percent increase of prices would lead to a reduction in demand of less than 1 percent. In the long run, however, the reduction appeared to be larger because economic agents have a wider range of options available for responding, such as new techniques, reorganisation, relocation or shifting to other goods or services. Jayadevappa and Chhatre reinforce this argument by stating that the trade and environment literature indicates that when a country eliminates some of its internal pollution, it has to allocate the required resources.

Such measures shift productive capabilities from internationally tradable goods to goods that cannot be traded. As a result, in the presence of pollution control, import and export levels are expected to be lower than the level they would otherwise be. However, a considerable part of the literature appears not to have found support for either of the above mentioned approaches. Hence they contend that environmental costs appear to have no real impact, neither negative nor positive, on foreign trade.

His study also found that the relative abundance or scarcity of environment between countries was a determinant of price differences between them. Therefore, environmental factors could define comparative advantage of countries through environmental endowment.

He argued that a country with fewer environmental attributes would export less pollution-intensive commodities and vice versa. However, if the country put environmental measures into place, its competitiveness in pollution-intensive commodities would decline. This would lead to a reduction in exports of pollution intensive commodities and overall trade. Interestingly, Siebert also argues that the same set of premises led to different results if the observed country was large.

In this case, after protection measures are implemented the comparative advantage of the large country would be reduced. This could result in decreasing exports of high-pollution goods, which in turn may lead to an increase in the price of the polluting commodity on the world market.

Bommer investigates the question whether relocation was always caused by reduced competitiveness at home. Using a signalling approach, Bommer shows that industrial relocation may happen for purely strategic reasons. Some of the results in the study were rather surprising, for instance the finding that the probability of strategic capital flight increased with the amount of capital in question.

Taking air pollution as example, Baumol and Baumol and Oates argue that less developed countries may specialise in pollution intensive products in anticipation of economic growth. This strategy could increase their exports without adding to their employment or real earnings. Through trade, environmentally harmful production may be transferred to countries with relatively lax environmental standards, so-called pollution haven countries.

Contributions by Pething , Siebert , Yohe and McGuire , put forward the theoretical arguments which provide a framework for the so-called pollution haven hypothesis. This notion states that countries may receive economic gains in exchange for the degradation or depletion of their natural resources. The argument therefore implies that trade undercuts existing environmental protection laws. Furthermore, trade issues would also affect the design and functioning of international environmental agreements.

By modelling non-cooperative games between regions, Markusen et al. Ulph extends the model, and shows that the importance of environmental policy in terms of its impact on location decisions appeared much greater than in earlier estimates. Competition between the two governments in the game to restrict pollution will result in highly restrictive policies and low levels of pollution and trade. Ulph and Valentini show that under certain circumstances, environmental regulation can affect relocation decisions of industries between countries.

In a later article, Ulph and Valentini note that competition for location could not generally be presumed to lead to greater environmental dumping than competition for market share with fixed locations. Thus, competition between non-cooperative governments can be greater when legislators set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate. One concept evolves around pollution havens and the notion of industrial flight from areas with stringent environmental regulation.

The other approach is the industrial specialisation hypothesis, which centres on investigating whether environmental regulation influences foreign direct investment decisions Wilson et al. In a theoretical context, Wilson , Ulph , Rauscher ; , and List and Mason , among others, present a number of scenarios under which local environmental regulations may reasonably race to the bottom.

Fundamental to these theoretical models is the assumption that capital flows respond adversely to more stringent environmental regulations Jeppesen et al. Cumberland ; considers governmental strategies under the assumption of pure competition to alter environmental standards, arguing that regions are likely to relax them to attract industry.

He concludes that this competition would result in too low a level of environmental quality. In the context of developing countries, Wheeler challenges the notion of environmental legislators racing to the bottom for five reasons.

First, pollution control was not a critical cost factor for most private firms. Second, low income communities penalised dangerous polluters even when formal regulation was weak or absent. Third, rising income strengthened regulation. Fourth, local businesses controlled pollution because pollution abatement reduces costs. Fifth, large multinational firms generally adhered to OECD environmental standards in their developing-country operations.

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Locate your local office at www. To learn more about Wadsworth, visit www. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. You probably are curious—and maybe a little anxious—about what it involves. After all, statistics are math! Well, relax. Statistics do not require that you be a math wizard. Students in the behavioral sciences throughout the world take a course like the one you are about to take, and they get through it.

In fact, sta- tistics can be fun! They are challenging, there is an elegance to their logic, and you can do nifty things with them. In this chapter we first deal with some common misconceptions that students have about statistics. Here are some frequently asked questions that will teach you something about statistics and your statistics course. What Are Statistics? The term statistics is often used as a shorthand for statistical procedures.

Also, some of the answers that we compute are called statistics. Why Must I Learn Statistics? Statistics are an integral part of psychology and other behavioral sciences, so statistics and statistical concepts are used every day. Therefore, to understand your chosen field of study, you must understand statistics.

What Do Researchers Do with Statistics? Statistics are tools used in research. They are needed because the behavioral sciences are based on empirical research.

The word empirical means that knowledge is obtained through observation and measure- ment, and behavioral research measures behaviors. Such measurement results in num- bers, or scores. These scores obtained in research are the data. By the way, the word 1 Copyright Cengage Learning, Inc. For example, to study intelligence, researchers measure the IQ scores of different individuals; to study memory, we examine data that re- flect the number of things that people remember or forget; to study social interactions, we measure the distance people stand apart or their anxiety when meeting someone.

And so on. Thus, any study typically produces a very large batch of scores that must be made manageable and meaningful. At this point, statistics are applied because they help us to make sense out of the data. The procedures we will discuss do this in four ways. First, some procedures organize the scores so that we can more clearly see any patterns in the data. Often this simply involves creating a table or graph.

Second, other statistics summa- rize the scores. Instead, a summary—such as the average score—allows us to quickly and easily understand the general characteristics of the data. Third, statistics communi- cate the results of a study. Researchers have created techniques and rules for this and, because everyone uses the same rules, it is much easier for us to communicate with each other, especially in published research reports.

Finally, statistics are used to conclude what the data indicate. All behavioral research is designed to answer a question about a behavior and, ultimately, we must decide what the data tell us about that behavior. This sounds crazy but what is important is the research that does or does not support this therapy. As a responsible professional, you would evaluate the research supporting this therapy before you would use it.

You could not do so without understanding statistics. This book is written for students who have not yet studied how to conduct research. When we discuss each statistic, we also discuss simple studies that employ the procedure, and this will be enough.

Later, when you study research methods, you will know the appropriate statistical procedures to use. This is not a math course. We will discuss some research tools that happen to involve mathematical operations.

But it is simple math: adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, finding square roots, and drawing simple graphs. Also, we will continuously review the math operations as they are needed. We will simply learn when to use the procedure that statisticians say is appropriate for a given situation, then compute the answer and then determine what it tells us about the data. This course is not a test of whether you should change your college major! Second, researchers usually do not memorize the formulas.

For quick reference, at the end of each chapter in this book is a list of the formulas discussed. Finally, statistics are simply a tool used in research, just like a wrench is a tool used to repair automobile engines.

A mechanic does not need to be an expert wrencher who loves to wrench, and you do not need be an expert statistician Copyright Cengage Learning, Inc. Rather, in the same way that a mechanic must understand how to correctly use a wrench, your goal is to be able to correctly use statistics. Statistics do involve many strange symbols and unfamiliar terms. A ma- jor part of learning statistics is merely learning the code. Think of it this way: To understand research you must speak the language, and you are about to learn the language of statistics.

Once you speak this language, much of the mystery surrounding statistics evaporates. But, Those Formulas! What makes some formulas appear difficult is that they are written in a code that communicates a sequence of operations: You first might square the scores, then add them together, then divide by some other number, and so on. Each example involves an unrealis- tically small number of scores, although real research involves large numbers of scores.

With practice the formu- las become easy, and then the rest of the mystery surrounding statistics will evaporate. Statistical procedures are a tool that you must learn to apply. Ultimately you want to make sense of data, and to do that, you must compute the appropriate statistic and then correctly interpret it.

More than anything else, you need to learn when and why to use each pro- cedure and how to interpret its answer. Be sure to put as much effort into this as you put into the calculations.

What about Using a Computer to Do Statistics? At first glance, you might think that this book was written before the invention of computers. However, researchers usually do use computers to compute statistics. Recently, the new version 17 was released and, for some reason, the name was changed to PASW. The instructions in Appendix B are appropriate for version 17, and where needed, different instructions are provided so they are appropriate for earlier versions also.

Even if your instructor cannot include this program in your statistics course, eventually you will want to learn it or one like it. Then you can compute the statistics discussed in this book quickly and accurately.

Recognize that, although SPSS is a wizardlike program, it cannot select the appro- priate statistical procedure for you nor interpret the answer. You really must learn when to use each statistic and what the answer means. You do not speak the language yet, so you must translate the terminology and symbols into things that you understand, and that takes time and effort.